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“On Target”: Precision and Balance in the
Contemporary Law of Targeting
Michael N. Schmitt* & Eric W. Widmar**
INTRODUCTION
The law of targeting lies at the heart of international humanitarian law (IHL).
As such it is the fulcrum around which discussion of combat operations
revolves. This was the case during the recent war in Iraq,1 and remains so with
respect to the conflicts in Afghanistan2 and Syria.3 The precise applicability of
the law of targeting has sparked a flurry of recent reports about drone opera-
tions by UN Special Rapporteurs and non-governmental organizations4 and
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1. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN
IRAQ (2003), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1203_sumrecs.pdf [hereinafter HRW
Iraq Report]; Michael N. Schmitt, The Conduct of Hostilities During Operation Iraqi Freedom: An
International Humanitarian Law Assessment, 6 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 73-109 (2003); Dinah
PoKempner, Marc Garlasco & Bonnie Docherty, Off Target on the Iraq Campaign: A Response to
Professor Schmitt, 6 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L., 111-25 (2003).
2. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, FATALLY FLAWED: CLUSTER BOMBS AND THEIR USE BY THE UNITED STATES
IN AFGHANISTAN (2002), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us-afghanistan/; Michael N. Schmitt, Tar-
geting and Int’l Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, 85 INT’L L. STUDIES 307 (2009); Michael N.
Schmitt, Targeting Narcoinsurgents in Afghanistan: The Limits of International Humanitarian Law,
12 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 301 (2009) [hereinafter Schmitt, Targeting Narcoinsurgents].
3. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/65 (Feb. 12, 2014).
4. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms While Countering Terrorism, Third Annual Rep. pursuant to G.A. Res. 66/171 and Human Rights
Council Res. 15/15, 19/19 and 22/8, ¶¶ 24, 55-56, 61-62, 65 (2013) (by Ben Emmerson), transmitted by
Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/68/389 (Sept. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Emmerson 2013];
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
While Countering Terrorism, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶¶ 70-71, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/
25/59 (Mar. 10, 2014) (by Ben Emmerson) [hereinafter Emmerson 2014]; Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
¶¶ 13, 67-73, 75 (2013) (by Christof Heyns), transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A/68/382 (Sept. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Heyns 2013]; AMNESTY INT’L, “WILL I BE NEXT?”: US DRONE
STRIKES IN PAKISTAN 58 (2013); HUM. RTS. WATCH, “BETWEEN A DRONE AND AL-QAEDA”: THE CIVILIAN
COST OF US TARGETED KILLINGS IN YEMEN 88 (2013) [hereinafter HRW Drone Report]. On the reports,
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underpins the highly contentious debates over the legality of autonomous
weapons systems.5
That IHL occupies center stage in contemporary discourse about armed
conflict is heartening, for it demonstrates the law’s vitality. In assessing this
discourse, it is essential to grasp that IHL is a body of law that represents a
carefully crafted balance between the desire of states to retain the capability to
effectively conduct military operations and the humanitarian mandate of both
shielding those who are uninvolved in a conflict from its tragic consequences
and protecting those who are involved, such as members of the armed forces,
from unnecessary harm.6 The efficacy of this body of law depends on mainte-
nance of the delicate balance between military necessity and humanitarian
concerns. Mischaracterization or misapplication of IHL norms risks imbalance,
thereby jeopardizing the innocent and potentially eroding state support for IHL’s
application. Precision and balance when applying a body of law governing
lethal force should not be optional.
Regrettably, while some of the current debate and commentary surrounding,
inter alia, drone operations, autonomous weapons systems, cyber operations,
and the current conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Ukraine, to
name just a few, is highly sophisticated, much of it has been characterized by
imprecise, skewed, or wrong assertions regarding the law of targeting. It is
therefore a propitious moment to revisit the structure and content of targeting
law. After briefly placing the law of targeting in the broader context of IHL,
this article examines the five constituent elements of a targeting operation:
(1) target; (2) weapon; (3) execution of the attack; (4) collateral damage and
incidental injury; and (5) location. The legality of an engagement depends on
full compliance with the rules set out for each category.
see also Michael N. Schmitt, Narrowing the International Law Divide: The Drone Debate Matures,
39 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2014).
5. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS (2012), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUpload.pdf [hereinafter HRW Killer Robots Re-
port]; Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Extrajudicial, Summary
or Arbitrary Executions (2013) (by Christof Heyns), transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013); Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop:”
Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231 (2013);
Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the
Critics, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231 (2013) [hereinafter Schmitt, Autonomous Weapons Systems]; Kenneth
Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t
Work and How the Laws of War Can, HOOVER INSTITUTION (2013), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/documents/Anderson-Waxman_LawAndEthics_r2_FINAL.pdf; Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability
of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 787 (2012). The NGO community has
launched a coordinated campaign to ban the systems. Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, available at
http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/. In February 2014, the European Parliament proposed a resolution to
ban the systems as well. Joint Motion for Resolution on the Use of Drones, Eur. Parl. Doc. RC-
B7-0201/2014, ¶ H(2)(d) (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef!-//
EP//TEXT"MOTION"P7-RC-2014-0201"0"DOC"XML"V0//EN&language!en.
6. Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law:
Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L LAW 795 (2010).
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I. THE LAW OF TARGETING IN THE NORMATIVE CONTEXT
IHL, also known as the jus in bello, must be distinguished from the jus ad bel-
lum. Whereas the latter addresses when states may resort to force (e.g., pursuant
to a Security Council Resolution or in self-defense), the former governs how
hostilities may be conducted during international and non-international armed
conflict. By the rule of equal application, IHL applies to all parties in an armed
conflict irrespective of the jus ad bellum. Thus, even a state that finds itself
embroiled in an armed conflict because it has been unlawfully attacked must
comply fully with IHL’s dictates.
As with international law generally, IHL takes the form of either treaty law
for states party or customary law binding on all states.7 The 1977 Additional
Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions captures the bulk of contemporary
targeting law.8 Most states are party to the instrument (173 of 193 states) and
are therefore bound directly by its terms.9 Certain key states, most notably the
United States and Israel, are not parties.10 However, they and other non-party
states consider nearly all of the treaty’s targeting provisions as reflective of
customary international law.11 Accordingly, they accept that they are bound by
the norms in their customary guise. Except as indicated, the references to AP I
set forth in this article replicate accepted rules of customary law12 and therefore
7. Customary law emerges over time through a combination of state practice and opinio juris – the
belief of states that they are engaging in an action or refraining from one out of legal obligation. Statute
of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; Case Concerning the
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶¶ 27, 34 (June 3). See also Yoram
Dinstein, The Interaction Between Customary International Law and Treaties 322 RECUEIL DES COURS
243-327 (2006); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. OF
THE RED CROSS 175 (2005).
8. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].
9. International Committee of the Red Cross Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), (June 8, 1977) available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates!XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected!470.
10. Other states not party to Additional Protocol I include Turkey, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Iran,
Pakistan, India, Nepal, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea,
Somalia, Eritrea, Bhutan, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, South Sudan, and Singapore. Id.
11. See, e.g., Rem. by Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation
of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in
2 AM. U. J. OF INT’L L. AND POL’Y 419 (1987) (also citing provisions that the U.S. does not consider
customary). The authors will use the United Kingdom’s Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict and the
United States’ Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations to illustrate guidance provided
by states to their military forces by a party and non-party state respectively. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL]; DEPT. OF THE NAVY,
U.S. MARINE CORPS., DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12/
COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (2007)
[hereinafter U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK].
12. See, e.g., 1 CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck
eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL Study]; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 1.33.1; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN
POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON INT’L L. APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE, cmt. ac-
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apply to targeting operations regardless of whether a state is party to AP I.
The condition precedent to IHL’s applicability is the existence of an “armed
conflict” as a matter of law; absent an armed conflict, international human rights
law (which also has limited application during armed conflict, although the
scope and extent remain unsettled)13 and domestic law govern any targeting of
individuals or objects. There are two forms of armed conflict – international
armed conflict (IAC) between two or more states, such as that between Ukraine
and Russia,14 and non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between a state and
an organized armed group (or between multiple organized armed groups), like
those in Syria, Afghanistan, and most recently, the Central African Republic.15
Since the applicable customary law of targeting is very similar in the two forms
of conflict, the discussion that follows generally applies to both. It also applies
irrespective of the medium of conflict in which the targeting occurs, be it land,
sea, air, space, or cyberspace.16
II. THE TARGET
The principle of distinction serves as the keystone in the law governing
targeting. Recognized by the International Court of Justice as one of two
“cardinal” principles of international humanitarian law,17 it has been codified in
Article 48 of AP I:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.18
companying r. 1(s), ¶ 4, 30 (2013) [hereinafter AMW MANUAL]; TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INT’L L.
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 6 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
13. See, e.g., Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law, in INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. AND INT’L HUM. RTS. L.: THE COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF
EUROPEAN LAW 95 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011).
14. Pursuant to Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Conventions apply during
armed conflict, including “all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting
Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.” See, e.g., Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I].
15. Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions addresses non-international armed conflict.
See, e.g., GC I, supra note 14, art. 3; S.C. Res. 2149, para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2149 (Apr. 10, 2014).
16. AP I, supra note 8, art. 49(3); AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, at xiv; TALLINN MANUAL, supra
note 12, r. 20.
17. Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J 226, ¶ 78
(July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. The other is the prohibition on causing combatants “unneces-
sary suffering.”
18. AP I, supra note 8, art. 48. See also CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 1; UK MANUAL, supra note 11,
¶¶ 15.8-15.9; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 5.3.2; INT’L AND OPERATIONAL L. DEP’T,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL L. HANDBOOK 13
(2013) [hereinafter OPLAW HANDBOOK]; Prosecutor v. Blas˘kic´, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 180
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Distinction, from which an array of specific IHL rules derive, operates in all
targeting operations. If, how, and when the principle and rules apply depends on
whether a person or an object is being targeted. In the vernacular of IHL,
targeting is known as “attack,” which is defined as an act of “violence against
the adversary, whether in offence or defence.”19
Persons: IHL affords certain categories of persons and the activities in which
they engage special protection from attack. These include medical,20 religious,21
civil defense,22 humanitarian relief personnel,23 and civilian journalists perform-
ing professional functions.24 However, the sine qua non of protection for
individuals is, as evident in Article 48 of AP I, distinguishing between combat-
ants and civilians.
Article 51(2) operationalizes the principle of distinction with respect to
civilians: “[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall
not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”25 AP I
defines a civilian in the negative as “any person who does not belong to one of
the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the
[1949] Third [Geneva] Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol.”26 These
provisions have been the subject of significant controversy and confusion since
their adoption, in part because Article 4 addresses prisoner of war status, not
status for the sake of targeting. However, civilians are best understood as
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission,
Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claim, Partial Award, ¶ 95 (Dec. 19,
2005); Abella v. Argentina, Merits, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R., No. 11.137, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 ¶ 177
(1997) [hereinafter Abella Case]. For a concise articulation of the principle of distinction, see Yoram
Dinstein, Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International Armed Conflicts, in 38 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 1 (2008).
19. AP I, supra note 8, art. 49(1). Despite the reference to the “adversary,” the notion clearly
includes violence against protected persons and places given the various prohibitions contained in
treaty and customary law on “attacking” them.
20. GC I, supra note 14, arts. 24-26; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 36, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter GC II]; AP I, supra note 8, art. 15; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts,
art. 9, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 25; U.S.
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.10.2.1.
21. GC I, supra note 14, art. 24; GC II, supra note 20, art. 36; AP I, supra note 8, art. 15; AP II,
supra note 20, art. 9; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 27; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11,
¶ 8.10.2.1.
22. AP I, supra note 8, arts. 62, 67.
23. Id., art. 71(2); CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 31.
24. AP I, supra note 8, art. 79; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 34.
25. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(2). See also CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 2; UK MANUAL, supra note
11, ¶¶ 5.21-5.21.1; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 5.3.2; United States Air Force
Doctrine, Vol. IV (Operations), Annex 3–60, Targeting 90 (July 28, 2011) [hereinafter AFDD 3-60].
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic´, Case Number IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 521 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former
Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Kupreskic´ Judgment].
26. AP I, supra note 8, art. 50(1); Prosecutor v. Galic´, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 47, 49 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Galic´ Judgment].
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individuals who are not members of the “armed forces” and who therefore
enjoy protection from direct attack.27
At the risk of slight oversimplification, in the context of targeting, the armed
forces consist of two groups: traditional combatants and members of organized
armed groups. The term “combatants” refers to three types of individuals. First,
members of the regular armed forces are combatants.28 For example, during
the 1991 and 2003 IACs in Iraq, members of the uniformed armed forces of Iraq
and of all the Coalition States qualified as combatants on this basis. This
category includes members of a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency
that have been incorporated into the armed forces.29
Second, members of militias or volunteer corps that “belong to” a party to the
conflict also qualify as combatants when they: 1) wear a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance, 2) carry their arms openly, 3) abide by the laws of
war, and 4) operate under responsible command.30 On the modern battlefield,
few groups comply with all four criteria. For example, the Fedayeen Saddam,
an Iraqi militia that took part in the fighting during the initial stages of the 2003
invasion of Iraq, generally carried their weapons openly and were widely
regarded as being under the command structure led by Saddam Hussein’s eldest
son Uday. Soon after the conflict began, they shed their uniforms and adopted
irregular tactics against Coalition forces. Additionally, members of the group
regularly violated IHL by attacking civilians and using them as shields. Once
they did so, members of the Fedayeen Saddam no longer qualified as combat-
ants in the legal sense.
Third, the category of combatants includes members of a levee en masse. A
levee en masse consists of “[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces,
without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.”31 The concept
originated during the French Revolution and first found expression in the 1907
Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV.32 Members of a levee en masse
enjoy the benefits of combatant status, including combatant immunity and
27. CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 5.
28. GC I, supra note 14, art. 13; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 4(A)(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 3.
29. AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(3); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T-1234,
¶¶ 87-88, (Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/RUF/1234/SCSL-04-15-T-
1234.pdf.
30. GC III, supra note 28, art. 4(A)(2); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision
on Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 274 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/
tx_ltpdb/doc266175_04.pdf.
31. GC III, supra note 28, art. 4(A)(6). See also Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 2,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 5, 106; UK
MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶¶ 4.2.2, 4.8; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 5.4.1.1.
32. Hague Regulations, supra note 31, art. 2.
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prisoner of war status upon capture, but are also subject to attack on the same
basis as other combatants.33
Combatants may be attacked based solely on their status; the extent of their
involvement in the hostilities is irrelevant.34 There are several exceptions to this
rule. In particular, it is unlawful to attack combatants who are wounded, sick, or
shipwrecked;35 have unequivocally surrendered;36 have been captured;37 have
parachuted from an aircraft in distress;38 or enjoy protected status (such as
medical and religious personnel39), or to order that no quarter be afforded the
enemy.40
Consensus has emerged in the past decade as to another group of individuals
who do not qualify as civilians for the purpose of targeting – members of
“organized armed groups.” To be considered “organized,” a group must be
sufficiently structured to engage in military activities as a unit, albeit not to the
extent of the regular armed forces.41 Furthermore, to be considered “armed,”
the purpose of the group must be to engage in hostilities.42 As an example, the
Afghan Taliban maintains a tiered organization, loosely based upon tribal
traditions, that enables Mullah Mohammad Omar and the Supreme Taliban
Shura to exercise centralized decision making and broadly direct decentralized
execution through regional, local, and village Taliban cells.43 The Afghan
Taliban’s purpose is to expel anti-Taliban forces through violence and regain its
33. U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 5.4.1.1; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶¶ 4.2.2,
4.8, 8.3.1.
34. Prosecutor v. Kordic´ and C˘ erkez, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, ¶ 51 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004).
35. GC I, supra note 14, art. 12; GC II, supra note 20, art. 12; AP I, supra note 8, art. 41; CIHL
Study, supra note 12, r. 46; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶¶ 8.2.3, 8.2.3.2; UK
MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶¶ 5.6; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 15(b).
36. AP I, supra note 8, art. 41; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 46; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK,
supra note 11, ¶¶ 8.2.3, 8.2.3.3; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.6; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12,
r. 15(b).
37. AP I, supra note 8, art. 41; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 46; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK,
supra note 11, ¶ 8.2.3; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.6; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 132(a).
38. AP I, supra note 8, art. 42; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.2.3.1; UK MANUAL,
supra note 11, ¶ 5.7; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 132(a).
39. GC I, supra note 14, arts. 24-25; GCII, supra note 20, art. 37; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 25,
27; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶¶ 8.2.4.1, 8.2.4.2; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 8.8;
AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 71.
40. AP I, supra note 8, art. 40; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 46; Hague Regulations, supra note 31,
art. 23(d); UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.5.
41. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 32 (2009) [hereinafter Interpretive Guidance], available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples & Thomas
Wood, The Taliban: an Organizational Analysis, MILITARY REVIEW 58, 64-68 (May-June 2008).
42. Michael N. Schmitt, Status of Opposition Fighters in a Non-International Armed Conflict, in
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 120, 131 (Kenneth Watkin &
Andrew Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).
43. Id.
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pre-war status.44 Thus, the Taliban qualifies as an organized armed group, and
its members are lawful targets at any time based upon their membership in that
group.
The lawfulness of targeting specific members of an organized armed group is
the subject of on-going debate. According to the International Committee of
the Red Cross’s (ICRC’s) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Partici-
pation in Hostilities, treatment as a member of an organized armed group for
targeting purposes depends on whether the individual has a “continuous combat
function” within the group.45 Essentially, this means that the individual per-
forms activities for the group that would amount to direct participation in
hostilities (see below) even if he is not a member of an organized armed group.
Unlike individuals who do not belong to such groups but directly participate,
members of organized armed groups who have a continuous combat function
may be targeted even when they are not so participating. They are treated as
analogous to members of the armed forces. For instance, before his death in
2012, Badruddin Haqqani was a top operational commander in the Haqqani
network responsible for planning combat operations in Afghanistan as well as
providing command and control (C2) of certain operations.46 Because he used
Very High Frequency radios (VHF) for communications, he rarely needed to
cross the border into Afghanistan from his headquarters in Pakistan to engage
directly in attacks. However, his persistent role as an operational planner and
commander established his continuous combat function within the Haqqani
network and he was thus targetable at any time, subject to other limitations on
44. Id. at 64-65; see also The Taliban, MAPPING MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, http://www.stanford.edu/
group/mappingmillitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/367?highlight!the"taliban (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
45. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 41, at 33-35. The Interpretive Guidance was the result of a
major six-year research effort headed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, in which
approximately forty eminent international law experts, including government attorneys, military offi-
cers, representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academics participated with the
goal of providing greater clarity regarding the IHL governing the loss of protection from attack when
civilians involve themselves in armed conflict. For critique on the controversial aspects of the
Interpretive Guidance, see generally Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641
(2010); Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive
Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct
Participation in Hostilities]; Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 741 (2010); W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the
ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect,
42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion
of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HAR. NAT’L SEC. J. 5 (2010) [hereinafter
Schmitt, The Interpretative Guidance]. But see Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance between Military
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831 (2010).
46. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Office of the Spokesman, Designation of Haqqani Network Commander
Badruddin Haqqani, (May 11, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163021.htm. Badruddin
Haqqani was killed in Pakistan by a CIA drone strike on August 24, 2012. Sebastian Abbot, Badruddin
Haqqani Dead: Pakistani Officials Confirm Death Of Key Militant, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/30/badruddin-haqqani-dead-pakistan_n_1842469.html.
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targeting such as the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precau-
tions in attack (discussed in section VI). The separate issue of whether it would
be lawful to penetrate Pakistan’s sovereignty and use force against Badruddin
Haqqani is addressed in section VII.
While there is widespread consensus that members of an organized armed
group with a continuous combat function are susceptible to direct attack at any
time, many experts, including the authors, take a broader approach by which all
of the group’s members may be targeted irrespective of their function.47 They
argue that limiting attacks to members with a continuous combat function
would create disequilibrium in the law because members of the armed forces
and other lawful combatants are targetable regardless of the role they play in
their unit.48 Since the law recognizes protections for the regular armed forces
that members of organized armed groups do not enjoy, such as the right to
prisoner of war status and combatant immunity, it would seem incongruent to
afford these combatants less protection from attack than similarly situated
members of an organized armed group.
Some groups are composed of distinct military, political, or social wings,
such as Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Only members of
the military component may be treated as members of an organized armed
group for targeting purposes.49 The permissibility of targeting other members of
the group depends on whether they qualify as civilians directly participating in
the hostilities. When a group does not have distinct wings, as in the case of the
Afghan Taliban, the fact that members of the group may occasionally engage in
activities that do not involve hostilities, such as an operational commander who
also performs Taliban judicial functions, does not deprive the group of its
character as armed or the individual of his or her status as a lawful target.
As noted above, civilians enjoy protection from attack pursuant to the
principle of distinction. Those civilians who “directly participate in hostilities”
lose this protection “for such time” as they so participate.50 The ICRC’s Inter-
pretive Guidance, in an approach that has been widely accepted, suggests that
acts of direct participation consist of three cumulative constitutive elements.
First, the act in question “must be likely to adversely affect the military
operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively,
to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against
direct attack.”51 Second, there must be a direct causal connection between the
47. See Watkin, supra note 45, at 655-57, 674-82, 690-92; Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participa-
tion in Hostilities, supra note 45, at 704; Schmitt, The Interpretative Guidance, supra note 45, at 21-24;
Boothby, supra note 45, at 743, 753.
48. Id.
49. Interpretative Guidance, supra note 41, at 33-35.
50. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(3), at 26; AP II, supra note 20, art. 13(3); CIHL Study, supra note 12,
at 23-24; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 5.3.2-5.3.3; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at
¶ 8.2.2; Galic´ Judgment, supra note 26, at ¶ 48; Abella Case, supra note 18, ¶ 178.
51. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 41, at 47.
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act and the harm likely to result, or the act must be an integral part of a
coordinated military operation that causes the harm.52 Lastly, the act must have
a belligerent nexus in the sense of being related to the ongoing conflict.53
Certain activities clearly satisfy these criteria. There is broad agreement, for
instance, that Afghan civilians who personally conduct attacks, such as those
who emplace improvised explosive devices for pay but otherwise have no
affiliation to the Taliban, are directly participating in the hostilities and are thus
subject to attack while they are engaged in that activity.54 Additionally, civilians
who directly support engagements, like those providing early warning for an
impending ambush or transporting fighters to and from an attack, are also direct
participants.55 For instance, in Afghanistan’s Kunar Province, sympathetic civil-
ians sitting on hillsides surrounding commonly used landing zones occasionally
provide early warning – a form of military intelligence – of approaching helicop-
ters to enemy forces using VHF radios.56 This technique is especially common
at night in anticipation of special operations night raids. Even though not
members of the Taliban, they are nevertheless targetable for such time as they
pass intelligence to enemy forces.
The more difficult cases involve civilians who provide support without being
directly involved in engagements or other classic combat-related activities. For
instance, the Interpretive Guidance asserts that civilians who assemble and store
an improvised explosive device, or those who purchase and transport compo-
nents necessary for such weapons, cannot be considered direct participants
because the causal link is not direct enough.57 Other international experts
strongly disagree.58 Such “close cases” will have to be resolved on an individual-
ized basis.
A notably controversial direct participation issue is the status of human
shields.59 It is one of particular significance in light of the asymmetric tactics
adopted by insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, Gaza, and elsewhere. Facing over-
whelming firepower, insurgents regularly shelter military objectives and activi-
52. Id. at 51.
53. Id. at 58.
54. See, e.g., NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INT’L LAW 344 (2008).
55. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 41, at 54, 66.
56. Given the mountainous terrain in Kunar Province, there are a limited number of landing zones,
depending upon the size of the operation.
57. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 41, at 53-54. The Interpretive Guidance’s narrow view asserts
“the harm in question must be brought about in one causal step.” MELZER, supra note 54, at 344-45.
58. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 41, at 53 n.123; see, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial
Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International Law, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 77, 104
(2013) [hereinafter Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting].
59. On this topic, see generally Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian
Law, 47 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 292 (2009) [hereinafter Schmitt, Human Shields]; Rewi Lyall,
Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International Humanitarian Law
Obligations of States, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008).
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ties through the use of involuntary and voluntary shields.60 The practical issue is
not whether the human shields may be directly attacked; doing so would
generally serve no military purpose. Instead, it is whether any expected harm to
them during an attack on the military objective or activity they are shielding has
to be factored into the proportionality and precautions in attack analysis (dis-
cussed below). If they are direct participants, such collateral damage can be
ignored when performing the assessment; if not, it must be considered by the
attacker.
While it sometimes may be tactically difficult to determine whether a human
shield is participating voluntarily or involuntarily, legal understanding of the
issue has developed along this fault line. Most experts agree that involuntary
human shields do not lose their protected civilian status, and therefore any
expected harm to them must be taken into account by attackers.61 However,
disagreement surrounds the treatment of voluntary human shields in the target-
ing decision. The Interpretive Guidance contends that they directly participate
in hostilities only when creating a “physical obstacle to military operations of a
party to the conflict,” as when they “attempt to give physical cover to fighting
personnel supported by them or to inhibit the movement of opposing infantry
troops.”62 Some experts, including the authors, counter that all voluntary shields
are directly participating in hostilities – thus willingly forfeiting their protected
status – and do not count towards the proportionality assessment or factor into
the requirement to take precautions.63 Another view adopts a middle ground
approach and argues that while voluntary shields retain their protected status,
their voluntary participation “reduces the weight to be accorded to them” in the
proportionality assessment.64 Regardless of the position adopted, it is clear that
the more remote a civilian’s actions are from the actual hostilities, the more
tenuous the argument that he has lost protected status and is subject to attack.
A further controversy surrounds the “for such time” aspect of the direct
participation rule.65 The Interpretive Guidance avers that participation begins
60. See, e.g., Philippines: Mistreatment, Hostage-Taking in Zamboanga, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 19,
2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/19/philippines-mistreatment-hostage-taking-zamboanga. The
use of human shields is not limited to organized armed groups. States, such as the Syrian government
and Iraq, have used human shields. See UN Security-General, Report of the Secretary-General on
children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. S/2014/31 (Jan. 27, 2014);
HRW Iraq Report, supra note 1, at 5, 67-69.
61. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 139 (2012); IAN HENDERSON, THE
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK
UNDER ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I 215 (2009). See also U.S. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, app. A, ¶ 4(a)(1), (2013) [hereinafter JP 3-60].
62. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 41, at 56.
63. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT,
153-54 (2d ed. 2010); Schmitt, Human Shields, supra note 59. This appears to be the position of the
United States. U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.3.2 (stating voluntary human shields
“may be excluded from the proportionality analysis.”); JP 3-60, supra note 61, app. A, ¶ 4(a)(1).
64. BOOTHBY, supra note 61, at 139. See also UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.22.1; A.P.V. ROGERS,
LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 169-70 (2012).
65. For an extended discussion on the subject, see Boothby, supra note 45.
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with “measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of direct participa-
tion in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return from the location
of its execution.”66 For instance, a civilian who implants an IED is directly
participating in hostilities while he travels to the location, buries the weapon,
and returns home – in other words, throughout the course of the specific opera-
tion. At most other times, according to the Guidance, he is immune from attack.
Many legal experts, including the authors, counter that the concept of “for such
time” includes all periods during which a definitive causal link to hostilities
exists,67 such that, for example, the acquisition and storage of improvised
explosive device components, as well as the building of such devices for
imminent use, would be considered sufficiently direct to allow those involved to
be attacked while engaging in the activities.
The status of an individual can sometimes be unclear. To illustrate, consider
the earlier example of civilians sitting on a hillside overlooking a commonly
used helicopter landing zone. Without additional intelligence indicating they are
acting as an early warning system or engaging in other forms of direct participa-
tion, IHL requires them to be treated as civilians and protected from attack.68
Thus, when General John Allen, former commander of International Security
Forces-Afghanistan (COMISAF), reissued the COMISAF Tactical Directive
and directed all coalition forces to “presume that every Afghan is a civilian until
otherwise apparent,”69 he was simply reiterating a presumption that had long
been ensconced in international law. Note, however, that the mere existence of
some doubt is insufficient to preclude attack. After all, doubt is a persistent and
pervasive factor in combat. Rather, the degree of doubt must be at a level that
would cause a reasonable attacker in the same or similar circumstances to
question the status of the individual, a standard discussed below.
Controversy surrounding the use of so-called “signature strikes” usually
revolves around the principle of distinction. Signature strikes are generally
directed at persons “who bear certain signatures, or defining characteristics
associated with terrorist activity, but whose identities aren’t known.”70 Those
who exhibit certain “signatures,” such as being involved in planning and
executing attacks, are clearly targetable as direct participants in hostilities. The
66. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 41, at 65-68.
67. DINSTEIN, supra note 63, at 148; Boothby, supra note 45, at 749-52.
68. AP I, supra note 8, art. 50(1), at 26; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 4789 (Yves
Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]; UK
MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.3.1; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 12; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12,
r. 33. See also MELZER, supra note 54, at 354; Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milos˘evic´, Case No. IT-98-29/
1-T, Judgment, ¶ 946 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf.
69. International Security Assistance Force/United States Forces-Afghanistan, COMISAF’s Tactical
Directive (Nov. 30, 2011), available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/docs/20111105%20nuc
%20tactical%20directive%20revision%204%20(releaseable%20version)%20r.pdf.
70. DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESI-
DENCY 41 (2012).
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more difficult cases involve individuals who exhibit signatures that do not
clearly indicate membership in an organized armed group or direct participation
in hostilities. For instance, a group of males carrying AK-47s in a known hostile
area do not necessarily exhibit a signature sufficient for targeting, especially in
countries like Afghanistan and Yemen where the unstable security situation
requires prudent people to carry arms in self-defense. However, if the same
group of men are observed carrying military-grade weapons, such as rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs), heavy machine guns, and explosives in an area
frequently used by militants to ambush coalition or host-nation security forces,
such a signature could be sufficient to establish members of the group as valid
targets.
IHL’s treatment of the status of persons during an NIAC is analogous to that
in an IAC. Although the notion of combatancy is technically limited to the
latter, IHL does not prohibit the status-based targeting of a state’s security
forces or dissident armed forces during an NIAC.71 As to the targeting of
members of organized armed groups and civilians directly participating in
hostilities,72 the same rules generally apply – and the same disagreements ap-
pear – as in the case of IACs.
Objects: Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I prohibits attacking civilian
objects. The provision characterizes civilian objects as those which are not
military objectives.73 Article 52(2) defines the latter as “objects which by their
nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”74 The
United States and other AP I non-parties view the prohibition and attendant
definition as reflective of customary international law.75 If there is a question as
to whether an object that is “normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a
place of worship, a house or other dwelling, or a school,” is being used for
military purposes, and thus subject to targeting, a presumption that the object
71. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H. B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY, ¶¶ 1.1.2(a), 2.1.1 (2006) [hereinafter NIAC
MANUAL]. Note that all members of a dissident armed force are always targetable, whereas, by the
ICRC interpretation, only members of organized armed groups with a continuous function are tar-
getable at all times. See Interpretive Guidance, supra note 41, at 32-33.
72. AP II, supra note 20, art. 13(3).
73. See also CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 9; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.24.1; U.S. COMMAND-
ER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.3.
74. This definition is in accordance with other treaties. See, e.g., Amended Protocol on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices art. 2(6), May 3, 1996, 2048
U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter Amended CCW Protocol II].
75. U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.2; 2013 OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18,
at 22. See also CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 8; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying
r. 1(y) ¶ 1; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 38, ¶ 1; Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission, supra note 18, ¶ 113.
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retains its protected civilian status attaches until facts on the ground indicate
otherwise.76
There are two cumulative criteria that must be satisfied before targeting an
object: 1) it must make an “effective contribution” to the adversary’s military
action, and 2) attacking the object must offer a “definite military advantage.”77
The “effective contribution” made by the object to the adversary’s military
action need not be critical, or even significant, but it must in fact contribute to
the enemy’s military action.78 At the same time, the military advantage that the
attacker accrues from the engagement must be “definite” in the sense that it may
not be merely “potential or indeterminate.”79 The advantage attained may be
measured not simply by the immediate tactical gain, but also with respect to the
operational advantage accruing to the larger campaign.80 As a practical matter,
attacking most objects that make an effective contribution to the enemy’s
military action affords an attacker a definite military advantage.
An object can make an effective contribution through its “nature, location,
purpose, or use.”81 The “nature” of a military objective refers to its “inherent
characteristic or attribute which contributes to military action.”82 Tanks, artil-
lery pieces, warships, submarines, fighter jets, military barracks, and ammuni-
tion depots exemplify valid military objectives by nature because they inherently
make an effective contribution to military action.83
“Location” relates to “selected areas that have special importance to military
operations,”84 regardless of how those areas are currently being used. For
example, certain ancillary passes connected to the Khost-Gardez Pass in Afghani-
76. AP I, supra note 8, art. 52(3); UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.24.3; AMW MANUAL, supra
note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 22(d), ¶¶ 3-4; Galic´ Judgment, supra note 26, ¶ 51.
77. This is the position adopted, for example, in JP 3-60, supra note 61, app. A, ¶ 4(b)(1) (asserting
that “both [effective contribution to military action and definite military advantage] must apply before
an object that is normally a civilian object can be considered a military objective.”).
78. AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 1(y), ¶ 4. See also U.S. COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.9.1.
79. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 68, ¶ 2024; MELZER, supra note 54, at 293; JP 3-60, supra
note 61, Appendix A, ¶ 4(b)(8).
80. UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.33.5; UK Additional Protocol Ratification Statement, ¶ (i),
available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action!openDocument&document
Id!0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2 (last visited Apr. 16, 2014); AMW MANUAL, supra
note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 1(w), ¶ 6; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 38,
¶ 17; AFDD 3-60, supra note 25, at 89. See also HENDERSON, supra note 61, at 199-202 (providing a
more detailed discussion of why military advantage may be measured at the operational as opposed to
the tactical level, and why measuring military advantage at the strategic level is generally not
appropriate).
81. AP I, supra note 8, art. 52(2).
82. AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 22(a), ¶ 1. See also ICRC COMMENTARY,
supra note 68, ¶ 2020; DINSTEIN, supra note 63, at 96.
83. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 68, ¶ 2020; OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 23. See also
DINSTEIN, supra note 63, at 96-97.
84. AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 22(b). See also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra
note 68, ¶ 2021.
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stan are well-known smuggling routes for the Haqqani network.85 Assuming for
the sake of analysis that the Haqqani network is a component of the same
organized armed group led by the Afghan Taliban in the Afghanistan NIAC,
targeting such passes in order to block or degrade their usefulness would be
permissible based upon the location.86
“Purpose” denotes the intended future use of an object.87 The criterion
acknowledges that it is unnecessary for the attacker to wait until a civilian
object is actually being used for military purposes before striking it. An object’s
purpose may be deducible using various forms of intelligence, such as observa-
tion with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets (manned or
unmanned), human intelligence, or signals intelligence. However, when the
intended future use of an object is not perfectly clear, the attacker must act
reasonably given the information available at the time of the strike.88 As an
illustration, it is common in the Khost-Gardez Pass for insurgents travelling
between Pakistan and Afghanistan to use specific small shelters along well-
established mountain trails as safe-houses to store equipment, food, and other
items necessary to make the mountain crossing by foot.89 Provided an attacker
has reliable and timely information that such shelters will be used by insurgents
in the future for the same purposes, it would be permissible to target them
immediately in order to disrupt or degrade insurgent transportation routes.
Lastly, “use” refers to how an object is currently being employed.90 The
criterion applies in the case of civilian objects that are being used for military
purposes, but only during the period of use. It is important to note that a civilian
object becomes a military objective regardless of the extent of military usage.
Damage to distinct civilian components of the target must be considered in the
proportionality and precautions in attack analyses and may preclude attack on
either or both of those bases, but the object nevertheless qualifies as a military
objective once it is converted to military use, however slight.
The category of military objective by use is especially relevant on the
contemporary battlefield because non-state actors often use civilian objects,
85. Afghan and Coalition Forces Disrupt Haqqani Operations in K-G Pass, ISAF NEWS (Aug. 15,
2010), http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-and-coalition-forces-disrupt-haqqani-
operations-in-k-g-pass.html.
86. The Haqqani network joined the Taliban in the 1990s and its leader, Jalaludin Haqqani, was a
member of the Supreme Taliban Shura. See Haqqani Network, MAPPING MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS,
https://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/363 (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
The Haqqani network continues to receive orders from Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban leader.
Shaan Khan, The Afghan Taliban Says it Supports Haqqani, Not Pakistan, CNN (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/29/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban/.
87. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 68, ¶ 2022.
88. AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 22(c), ¶ 3.
89. Author’s personal experience as the senior legal adviser for a Joint Special Operations Task
Force in Afghanistan between 2010-2012.
90. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 68, ¶ 2022; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.4.4; OPLAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 23; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 22(d), ¶ 3;
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 38, ¶ 8.
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such as residences, religious sites, hospitals, and schools to support military
operations. For instance, uninhabited residences in Afghanistan regularly serve
as production factories for homemade explosives (HME).91 It should be cau-
tioned that insurgents frequently change locations to avoid detection by Coali-
tion and Afghan forces. A residence used as an HME production factory remains
a valid military objective only for as long as it is so used. Once the materials
and activities are moved, the residence regains protected civilian status and may
not be targeted.92
There is universal agreement that war-fighting and war-supporting objects
can qualify as military objectives on one of these four bases. A war-fighting
object is one used for combat; such objects are typically military in nature and
therefore almost always constitute military objectives. War-supporting objects
are those used to directly buttress the war effort, as in the case of a facility used
to produce improvised explosive devices. However, controversy surrounds
whether so-called “war-sustaining” objects are lawful military objectives, with
the United States and few other countries taking the position that they do. The
U.S. Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations defines war-
sustaining objects as “economic objects of the enemy that indirectly but effec-
tively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability.”93 Supporters of
this approach would, for instance, take the position that it is lawful to target the
Afghan poppy crop because of the substantial funding the Afghan Taliban
derives from opium production and trade.94 However, most international legal
experts would disagree because of the remoteness of the connection between
those activities and military action.95
Certain types of military objectives are subject to either specific rules or merit
particular care in application of the general rules. In the maritime environment,
enemy warships are valid military objectives by nature and may be targeted
subject to normal precautions in attack (discussed below).96 Additionally, en-
91. ISAF Joint Command-Afghanistan Press Release: Taliban Safe Havens, Explosives Caches
Cleared in Arghandab, NATO (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/taliban-safe-
havens-explosives-caches-cleared-in-arghandab.html. For an informative article on the bomb-making
industry, see Mujib Mashal, Afghanistan’s IED Complex: Inside the Taliban Bombmaking Industry,
TIME WORLD (Jan. 2, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/01/02/afghanistans-ied-complex-inside-the-
taliban-bomb-making-industry/.
92. See, e.g., UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 5.4.4(h) (providing a similar example of a divisional
headquarters using a textile factory for operations, thus making the textile factory subject to attack, but
only for so long as the headquarters remains present in the factory. If not, the textile factory would
regain its protected status and not be subject to attack); JP 3-60, supra note 61, Appendix A, ¶ 4(b)(7).
93. U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.2.5. See also AMW MANUAL, supra note 12,
cmt. accompanying rule 24; AFDD 3-60, supra note 25, at 91.
94. See generally Gretchen Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban (United States Institute of Peace,
Peaceworks Series 62, Aug. 2, 2009), available at www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/
taliban_opium_1.pdf (documenting how the Afghan opium trade supports the Taliban war-effort).
95. See generally Schmitt, Targeting Narcoinsurgents, supra note 2. See also HENDERSON, supra
note 61, at 142-44.
96. See UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 13.44; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.2.5;
SAN REMO MANUAL ON INT’L LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA, PT. III, § IV, ¶¶ 65-66 (Louise
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emy and neutral merchant vessels may be targeted if they make an effective
contribution to the enemy’s military effort by their purpose or use and targeting
them yields a definite military advantage.97 Conduct which renders them liable
to attack includes being incorporated into an enemy’s intelligence system,
sailing under convoy of enemy warships, laying mines, minesweeping, cutting
undersea cables, attacking friendly merchant ships, and acting as an auxiliary.98
Additionally, enemy merchant vessels may be attacked if they refuse an order to
stop or actively resist visit, search, or capture.99 Neutral merchant vessels may
be targeted, after prior warning, if they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop
or actively resist visit, search, or capture, although the attacker must first have a
reasonable belief the neutral merchant vessel is carrying contraband or attempt-
ing to breach a blockade.100
Military objectives in cyberspace can include computers, computer networks,
and other tangible components of cyber infrastructure so long as they meet the
definition set forth above.101 Controversy exists over whether data per se can
qualify as an object given its intangible characteristics.102 However, it is clear
that cyber infrastructure and other cyber related objects can be attacked by
destroying, altering, or manipulating data upon which they rely; in such cases,
the infrastructure constitutes the object of attack, not the data, and an assess-
ment of whether the target qualifies as a military objective is made based upon
the military use or nature of the infrastructure and objects. Additionally, military
and civilian users often share computers, computer networks, and cyber infra-
structure. As with other dual-use objects, such use for military purposes renders
them military objectives.103 When conducting attacks on dual-use cyber infra-
structure, the attacker must take into account the principle of proportionality
and the requirement to take precautions in attack (discussed below) – a particu-
lar challenge in cyberspace.
In aerial warfare, military aircraft may be targeted based upon their nature,
Doswald Beck ed., 1995), available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c
12563da005fdb1b/7694fe2016f347e1c125641f002d49ce?openDocument [hereinafter SAN REMO
MANUAL].
97. See UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶¶ 13.40, 13.47; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11,
¶¶ 7.5.1-7.5.2, 8.6.2.2; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 96, pt. III, § I, ¶ 40.
98. See UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 13.5(d); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 96, pt. I, § V, ¶ 13(h)
(stating that an auxiliary ship is a “vessel, other than a warship, that is owned by or under the exclusive
control of the armed forces of a state and used for the time being on government non-commercial
service.”). See also, U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 2.3.1.
99. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 96, pt. III, § IV, ¶ 60(e); U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK,
supra note 11, ¶ 8.6.2.2.
100. UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 13.47; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 7.10; SAN
REMO MANUAL, supra note 96, pt. III, § V, ¶ 67(a).
101. See AP I, supra note 8, art. 52(2); ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 68, ¶¶ 2007-2008; TALLINN
MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 38, ¶¶ 3-10.
102. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 38, ¶ 5.
103. See id., r. 39, ¶¶ 1-3.
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unless being used as a medical aircraft.104 Non-military aircraft, except civilian
airliners, may be downed if they engage in activities that make an effective con-
tribution to military action, such as conducting attacks, being integrated into the
enemy’s intelligence efforts, or providing troop or mate´riel transportation.105
Additionally, non-military aircraft that fail to comply with the orders of military
authorities for landing, inspection and possible capture, or that resist intercep-
tion, also qualify as military objectives.106
A civilian airliner that is being used for military purposes such as reconnais-
sance or transport of troops may only be targeted if: 1) diversion for landing,
inspection, and possible capture is not feasible; 2) no other method for exer-
cising military control is available; 3) the actions that render the civilian airliner
a military objective are sufficiently grave to justify an attack; 4) all feasible
precautions have been taken;107 5) the strike will not violate the principle of
proportionality;108 and 6) a warning has been issued whenever circumstances
permit.109 Civilian airliners and aircraft granted safe conduct are subject to
special legal requirements.110 They may be targeted if they violate the terms of
agreement permitting that safe conduct or intentionally hamper movements of
combatants, subject to the aforementioned six requirements.111 Given the signifi-
cant potential for the loss of noncombatant lives when targeting a civilian
airliner, it is understandable that special rules attach to such a situation.
Finally, a range of specific objects and facilities enjoy special protection
under treaty or customary IHL (or both) and may not be attacked unless they
104. See GC I, supra note 14, arts. 19, 35; GC II, supra note 20, art. 39; Convention (IV) Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 22, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
GC IV]; AP I, supra note 8, arts. 8(f), 8(g), 8(j), 24; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 96, pt. III, § 3, ¶ 53;
AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, § A, cmt. accompanying r. 1(u), ¶ 4. See also U.S. COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 2.2.6. A medical aircraft is “any aircraft permanently or temporarily
assigned – by the competent authorities of a Belligerent Party – exclusively to aerial transportation or
treatment of wounded, sick, or shipwrecked persons, and/or the transport of medical personnel and
medical equipment or supplies.” AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 1(u).
105. See UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶¶ 12.36-12.37; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11,
¶ 8.8; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 96, pt. III, § IV, ¶ 63; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, § E(II),
r. 27(a)-(c).
106. See UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶¶ 12.36-12.37; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11,
¶ 8.8; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 96, pt. III, § IV, ¶ 62(e); AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, § E(II),
r. 27(d)-(e).
107. See AP I, supra note 8, art. 57; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 15.
108. See AP I, supra note 8, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii); CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 14.
109. See AP I, supra note 8, art. 57(2)(a)(iii)(c); CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 20; UK MANUAL,
supra note 11, ¶ 12.32; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 96, pt. III, § 3, ¶ 57; AMW MANUAL, supra
note 12, § J(III), r. 68(a)-(d), 70.
110. See UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 12.7; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, § A, r. 1(i) (defining a
“[c]ivilian airliner” as “a civilian aircraft identifiable as such and engaged in carrying civilian
passengers in scheduled or non-scheduled service.”). Aircraft may be granted safe conduct by agree-
ment between belligerent parties. See also UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 12.28; U.S. COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.6.3; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, § J(II), r. 64.
111. See UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 12.30; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 96, pt. III, § 3, ¶ 55(c);
AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, § J(II), r. 65(a)(i).
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become military objectives. These include medical facilities and units;112 areas
specially established as civilian protective zones and for the care of the wounded
and sick;113 humanitarian relief facilities, supplies, and transports;114 peace-
keeping equipment and facilities;115 cultural property;116 works and installa-
tions containing dangerous forces, such as dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical
generating stations;117 the natural environment;118 and objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population, such as food and drinking water
supplies.119
III. THE WEAPON
Even when a lawful military objective is the intended target, attacks using
certain weapons are prohibited, a point confirmed in the Regulations annexed to
the 1907 Hague Convention IV: “the right of belligerents to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”120 A number of the prohibitions apply to
weapons generally. Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I prohibits the employ-
ment of weapons calculated or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering.121 Projectiles containing fragments that cannot be de-
tected using x-ray would, for instance, qualify on the basis that they complicate
medical treatment when the same disabling or lethal effect can be achieved
using metal fragments.
A second general prohibition relates to the use of indiscriminate weapons (as
112. See GC I, supra note 14, art. 19; AP I, supra note 8, arts. 12, 21-24; AP II, supra note 20,
art. 11; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 28-29.
113. See GC I, supra note 14, arts. 20, 23; GC IV, supra note 104, arts. 14-15; AP I, supra note 8,
art. 60; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 35-36.
114. See GC IV, supra note 104, arts. 55, 59; AP I, supra note 8, arts. 69-70; AP II, supra note 20,
art. 18(2); CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 32.
115. See Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel art. 7, Dec. 9,
1994, 2051 U.N.T.S 363; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 33.
116. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212; AP I, supra
note 8, art. 53; AP II, supra note 20, art. 16; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 38.
117. See AP I, supra note 8, art. 56; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 42. The U.S. does not consider
this article to reflect customary international law. See Matheson, supra note 11, at 419, 427.
118. AP I, supra note 8, arts. 35(3), 55. The U.S. does not consider these articles to reflect customary
international law. See Matheson, supra note 11, at 424. There is general agreement, however, that the
environment as such constitutes a civilian object subject to the general protection such objects enjoy. In
light of the unique nature of the environment as a location of battle, precise application of this
protection is unsettled, particularly with regard to the rule of proportionality. CIHL Study, supra
note 12, r. 43-45.
119. AP I, supra note 8, art. 54; AP II, supra note 20, art. 12; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 54.
120. Hague Regulations, supra note 31, art. 22.
121. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168. See also CIHL
Study, supra note 12, r. 79; NIAC MANUAL, supra note 71, ¶ 2.2.2; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt.
accompanying r. 5(b), ¶¶ 1, 3.
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distinct from the indiscriminate use of discriminate weapons).122 Weapons that
are incapable of being directed at a specific military objective are inherently
indiscriminate and their use is accordingly prohibited.123 The commonly cited
historical example is the German V-2 rocket in World War II. Its aiming
mechanism was so inaccurate that any attempt to use it to attack a particular
military objective, including large objectives such as military installations,
would likely fail; successful attack was essentially the product of luck.
It is extremely rare for weapons to be prohibited as indiscriminate per se
because their ability to discriminate usually depends not only on technical
capabilities, but also on the environment in which they are employed. Consider
the Iraqi SCUD missiles used during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. While
SCUD missiles have been described as “highly inaccurate and prone to breakup
in flight,”124 the weapon could be aimed sufficiently to direct attacks against
large military installations, such as the Dhahran Airfield in Saudi Arabia.125
However, when Iraq employed this otherwise lawful weapon against major
cities in Israel and Saudi Arabia, Iraq violated the prohibition on indiscriminate
attacks (discussed below) because the weapons were insufficiently accurate to
reliably target military objectives within those urban areas.126
The advent of fully autonomous weapon systems (AWS) has raised anew the
issue of the distinction between indiscriminate weapons and the indiscriminate
use of weapons.127 Despite claims that the systems cannot comply with IHL,
their ability to discriminate depends on the capabilities of their on-board sensor
suite, the system’s algorithms and processing capability, and the environment in
which they are used. There is no question that AWS will employ weapons that
are very accurate; the issue is instead whether they will be able to distinguish
lawful from unlawful targets when operating on the battlefield, including the
ability, in certain situations, to interpret ambiguous human behavior. If not,
they are indiscriminate per se. Yet, there are environments where there are no
unlawful targets present, such as sections of the high seas or remote areas.
Additionally, technical advances will dramatically enhance sensor and process-
122. The International Court of Justice has labeled the prohibition on indiscriminate weapons as one
of two “cardinal” principles, the other being the principle of unnecessary suffering. Nuclear Weapons,
supra note 17, ¶ 78; Kupreskic´ Judgment, supra note 25, ¶ 524.
123. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(4); CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 12; UK MANUAL, supra note 11,
¶ 6.4; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 9.1.2; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 5(a);
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 43.
124. FRANK N. SCHUBERT & THERESA L. KRAUS, THE WHIRLWIND WAR: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM 154 (1995). See also DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 93 (1992).
125. SCHUBERT & KRAUS, supra note 124, at 250. The attack on the Dharan Airfield struck a
warehouse that had been converted into military barracks, killing 28 American soldiers and wounding
97 others.
126. CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, supra note 124, at 621-23; SCHUBERT & KRAUS, supra
note 124, at 246-47.
127. See generally Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 5; Schmitt, Autonomous Weapons Systems, supra
note 5.
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ing capabilities. Thus, the proper question is not whether they are unlawful
per se, but rather whether their use in a particular environment and combat
context will meet IHL requirements.
Weapons are also unlawfully indiscriminate if their effects cannot be con-
trolled.128 The paradigmatic examples are biological contagions or persistent
airborne chemical agents that can easily spread to civilian populations, even if
properly aimed at military objectives.129 In more modern times, particular
types of malware in cyberspace could, by their very design and the target sets
for which they are intended, be either unable to discriminate between military
and civilian cyber targets or have uncontrollable effects.130 In most cases,
however, such weapons would not be indiscriminate per se because they could
be introduced into closed military networks.
Specific international treaties have prohibited particular weapons or restricted
their use, in many instances because of humanitarian concerns over the use of
such weapons. These include poison,131 explosive bullets,132 expanding bul-
lets,133 biological and chemical weapons,134 anti-personnel land mines,135 booby-
128. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(4); UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 6.4; AMW MANUAL, supra
note 12, r. 5(a); TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 43; AFDD 3-60, supra note 25, at 89.
129. The U.S. Commander’s Handbook misuses the example of targeting an “entire large city when
the object of attack is a small enemy garrison in the city” to illustrate the prohibition on indiscriminate
attacks whose effects cannot be controlled. See U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 5.3.2.
The example provided by the U.S. Commander’s Handbook would more accurately illustrate the
prohibition on attacks that are not directed at a specific military objective.
130. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities ¶ 1-14 (February
2014); TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 49, ¶ 3.
131. Hague Regulations, supra note 31, art. 23(a); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,
26 U.S.T. 571, reprinted in 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 49 (1975) [hereinafter 1925 Protocol on
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases].
132. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes
Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, available at http://www.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action!openDocument&documentId!568842C2B90F4A29C12563CD
0051547C (prohibiting the use of projectiles weighing below 400 grammes that are either explosive or
charged with fulminating or inflammable substances).
133. Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, 1899, available at http://www.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId!D528A73B322398B5C12563CD002D6716&action!open
Document (prohibiting the use of “bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body). Note that
the prohibition relates to use during armed conflict. Many states use such rounds for law enforcement
purposes because of their significant stopping power. See DINSTEIN, supra note 63, at 70.
134. 1925 Protocol on Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, supra note 131; Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruc-
tion, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
135. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices,
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 [hereinafter CCW Protocol II]; Amended CCW Protocol II, supra
note 74; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
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traps,136 incendiary weapons,137 blinding lasers,138 cluster munitions,139 naval
mines,140 and torpedoes.141 States party to the respective instruments are bound
by their prohibitions and restrictions. Moreover, many of the provisions are now
viewed as reflective of customary law, and as such, bind even non-parties.142
IV. EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK
Assuming a target qualifies as a military objective and the weapon used is
lawful, an attacker (which in IHL includes those who plan, approve, or execute
attacks) must nevertheless, as noted in Article 57 of AP I, take “constant care
. . . to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects.”143 This
general obligation, known as the requirement to take precautions in attack, is
operationalized in a number of specific rules.
Before turning to those rules, a cautionary note is in order. IHL only requires
the taking of precautions that are feasible.144 Feasibility is generally understood
as referring to steps that are “practicable or practically possible, taking into
account all circumstances prevailing at the time, including humanitarian and
military considerations.”145 The ICRC Commentary to Article 57 sagely points
out that what is practicable or practically possible entails “common sense and
good faith.”146 Fundamentally, the “feasible” standard requires attackers to take
those measures to avoid civilian harm that a reasonable attacker would take in
136. Amended CCW Protocol II, supra note 74. For a detailed explanation of the definition of booby
traps and the intricacies of international law concerning them, see UK MANUAL, supra note 11,
¶¶ 6.7-6.7.9; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 9.6.
137. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter CCW Protocol III].
138. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370 (prohibiting the use
and transfer of laser weapons “specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their
combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the
eye with corrective eyesight devices.”).
139. Convention on Cluster Munitions, opened for signature, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 INT’L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 357 (2008).
140. Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines arts. 1(1)
& (2), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332 [hereinafter Hague Convention VIII]; UK MANUAL, supra note 11,
¶¶ 13.52-13.64; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶¶ 9.2.2-9.2.3.
141. Hague Convention VIII, supra note 140, art. 1(3); see also UK MANUAL, supra note 11,
¶ 13.51; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 9.4.
142. CIHL Study, supra note 12, rs. 72-74, 77-86.
143. AP I, supra note 8, art. 57(1); see also CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 15; UK MANUAL, supra
note 11, ¶ 5.32; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.3.1; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12,
r. 52; Kupreskic´ Judgment, supra note 25, ¶ 524.
144. AP I, supra note 8, arts. 57(2)(a)(i) & (ii). The condition of feasibility is generally understood
to apply to all of the precautionary requirements set forth in Article 57.
145. See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
UK Reservation; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 15; CCW Protocol II, supra note 135, art. 3(4); CCW
Protocol III, supra note 137, art. 1(5); and, Amended CCW Protocol II, supra note 74, art. 3(10). It also
appears in the ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 68, ¶ 2198 and is discussed in MELZER, supra note 54,
at 365.
146. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 68, ¶ 2198.
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the same or similar circumstances – based upon information “reasonably avail-
able [to the attacker] at the relevant time and place.”147 In making the feasibility
assessment, those involved in an attack may take into account military consider-
ations, such as risk to friendly forces, the availability of weapon systems, or
other operational demands for surveillance resources, such as unmanned aerial
vehicles. The reasonableness of their actions is the touchstone for determining
compliance with IHL. The law allows for mistakes in the Clausewitzian “fog of
war.” Intelligence may be incomplete or faulty, technology may fail to function
properly, and tactical conditions may change after a targeting decision has been
made and beyond the point at which an attack may be abandoned. IHL does not
require perfection.
In terms of specific precautions in attack requirements, those who plan or
approve attacks are obligated to “do everything feasible to verify that the
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects . . . [or] sub-
ject to special protection . . . .”148 For instance, the loiter capability and sophisti-
cated sensor suite of unmanned aerial systems has significantly enhanced the
capability of states fielding such systems to verify target status. Systems like
the Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS) found aboard some drones include
visible and infrared ranging capabilities that facilitate identification of the
nature of a potential target, day or night.149 As noted, however, the requirement
to use them is framed by the feasibility condition. In some cases, sufficient
verification by other methodologies may render it operationally unwise to place
advanced and sparse systems at risk. In others, higher priorities may make their
use ill-advised operationally. For instance, if the capabilities of the MTS or the
loiter capability of the Predator or Reaper drones are needed elsewhere on the
battlefield, the attacker may resort to a less sophisticated method of target
verification, such as a soldier equipped with binoculars or night vision goggles.
The level of legal (as distinct from operational or policy) certainty necessary
for target identification is unsettled. Some observers demand near absolute
certainty by positing a requirement that an attacker seek additional information
even if there is a “slight doubt” as to the status of a target.150 The reality of
combat – particularly in counterinsurgency operations – makes attainment of
147. UK Additional Protocol Ratification Statement, supra note 80, ¶ (c); see also Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, with annexed Protocols, U.S. Understanding
¶ (1)(A), opened for signature Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra
note 11, ¶ 8.3.1; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 38; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompany-
ing r. 1(q), ¶ 3.
148. AP I, supra note 8, art. 57(2)(a)(i); CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 16.
149. Andrew Mondy & Gregory Roth, Raytheon’s Multi-Spectral Targeting System, 2 RAYTHEON’S
TECHNOLOGY TODAY 36 (2012), http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/technology_today/2012_i2/pdf/
2012_i2.pdf.
150. See, e.g., ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 68, ¶ 2195. Other states have created disparate levels
of ‘doubt’ necessary to prevent an attack. For example, New Zealand requires “substantial doubt,”
while Israel requires “significant doubt.” 2 CUSTOMARY INTL. HUMANITARIAN L.: PRAC. 243-44 (Jean-
Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). Without a clear articulation from conventional
2014] 401PRECISION AND BALANCE IN TARGETING
such a standard impractical. Slight doubt will almost always exist on a counterin-
surgency battlefield where the enemy deliberately uses the civilian population to
disguise their activities, as is done in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Consider a situation in which timely and reliable intelligence indicates an
al-Qaeda leader is operating out of a remote village in Afghanistan’s mountain-
ous Nuristan Province. Human intelligence from a vetted and reliable source
reveals the al-Qaeda leader frequently travels between two particular houses
and wears a red and white keffiyeh, a distinctive Arab headdress not worn by
local Afghans. Signals intelligence confirms the presence of the al-Qaeda leader,
and drones overhead identify and track an individual wearing a red and white
keffiyeh travelling between the houses reported by the source. While some level
of doubt could exist as to whether this is the only red and white keffiyeh in the
village, the legal question is whether a reasonable attacker (a standard discussed
below), having employed all reasonably available means of verification under
the circumstances and in light of all of the intelligence available at the time,
would initiate the attack against the keffiyeh-wearing individual. It would seem
so in the abstract, although it must be cautioned that every case must be
evaluated on its own merits in light of all attendant circumstances.
Attackers are also required to take feasible precautions in the choice of means
(weapons) and methods (tactics) of attack in order to minimize “incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”151 Of course,
attackers need only select less harmful means or methods that do not involve
sacrificing military advantage and that are feasible. As an example, an attacker
does not have to use a less powerful bomb against an insurgent leader in a
building in order to avoid civilian casualties if doing so would significantly
lower the likelihood of success (assuming all other IHL requirements are met).
Of particular note in this regard are precision weapons. The decision to
employ a specific weapon system in a situation is highly contextual; categorical
declarations that precision weapons must be used are simply incorrect. For
instance, although precision weapons may be available for an operation, they
may be more useful at later stages of the campaign and thus need to be
preserved, or the employment of a precision weapon may be infeasible because
it would require increased risk to ground forces in order to designate a target.
Other systems may also avoid or minimize civilian harm without sacrificing
military advantage. As an example, carbon filament bombs can be used to
interrupt electricity with far less collateral damage than regular bombs, while
cyber operations are especially useful in avoiding collateral damage.
Attackers are likewise required to use tactics (“methods” of attack in IHL
parlance) that will minimize collateral damage, taking into account the risk to
IHL, the level of “doubt” permissible will likely remain a decision driven by policymakers based on the
operational environment.
151. AP I, supra note 8, art. 57(2)(a)(ii); see also CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 17; UK MANUAL,
supra note 11, ¶ 5.32.4; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 32(b); OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18,
at 26; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 54.
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friendly forces and other operational factors. To illustrate, an attacker may set
the fuse on an aerially-delivered bomb to delay the detonation by several
milliseconds so that its effects will be mitigated when it buries itself in the
ground or may strike a bridge at night when civilian traffic across it is likely to
be light. For the same reason, use of a “tactical call-out” became commonplace
in Iraq and Afghanistan.152 Once a compound was surrounded and secured,
soldiers would call out the occupants and ask them to leave the premise. The
occupants would then be separated and tactically questioned153 to identify who
else was present in the compound. If a commander was reasonably certain based
upon tactical questioning, any available overhead surveillance, and other sources
of intelligence that civilians were no longer present in the compound (or were
not going to leave and the attack would nevertheless be proportionate), he
could launch the attack. It must be emphasized that tactical call-out was
possible only because resources were readily available and it was feasible to
take such measures. An attacker without such assets who reasonably concluded
such actions were not feasible would not be required to engage in the tactic.
Beyond weapons and tactics choice, attackers must consider the full range of
targets that, if attacked, would yield the same or similar military advantage.
When options are available, the attacker must select the objective that “may be
expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects,”154
taking into consideration military factors, such as risk to friendly forces and
assets available to conduct the attack. To illustrate, take an attack designed to
disrupt the production of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED).
Two facilities are used – one to structurally prepare the vehicle to carry the
explosives and the other to install the explosives. The former is located in a
populated area, while the latter is in a remote location, but is heavily defended
and significant friendly casualties are anticipated in any attack against it. In this
situation, targeting the heavily defended objective would not be required be-
cause it would be militarily infeasible, even though its destruction would offer a
“similar military advantage” and cause less collateral damage.
Attackers are required to give advance warning if an attack may affect the
152. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, TACTICS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY, FM 3-42.2: U.S. ARMY FIELD
MANUAL 3-24.2, ¶¶ 5-48 (2009); Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force/United States
Forces-Afghanistan, COMISAF Night Operations Tactical Directive (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://
www.isaf.nato.int/images/docs/20111105%20nuc%20night%20operations%20tactical%20directive%20
(releaseable%20version)%20r.pdf (directing commanders to “initiate entry to the targeted residence by
means of . . . an Afghan-led call-out in the appropriate Afghan language.”).
153. The United States defines tactical questioning as “[t]he field-expedient initial questioning for
information of immediate tactical value of a captured or detained person at or near the point of capture
and before the individual is placed in a detention facility. Tactical questioning is generally performed by
members of patrols, but can be done by any appropriately trained DoD personnel. Tactical questioning
is limited to direct questioning.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 3115.09, DOD INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATIONS, DETAINEE DEBRIEFINGS, AND TACTICAL QUESTIONING 32 (2012).
154. AP I, supra note 8, art. 57(3); see also UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 13.32; AMW MANUAL,
supra note 12, r. 33; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 56.
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civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.155 In particular, ad-
vance warning that would result in a loss of operational surprise or increase of
risk to friendly forces is not required. As an example, in the 2006 airstrike in
Iraq against al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, providing a warning to
nearby civilians would have alerted him to flee.156 Sometimes, specific warn-
ings are not feasible, but an attacker may feasibly issue a general warning to the
civilian population. The dropping of hundreds of thousands of leaflets warning
Iraqi civilians to avoid military sites prior to the initiation of ground combat by
Coalition forces in 2003 illustrates this practice,157 as does the more modern use
of Twitter by the Israelis in 2012.158
Finally, it should be noted that defenders also shoulder a duty, to “the maxi-
mum extent feasible, [to] . . . endeavor to remove the civilian population, indi-
vidual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of
military objectives; avoid locating military objectives within or near densely
populated areas; [and] take the other necessary precautions to protect the
civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control
against the dangers resulting from military operations.”159 Failure to comply
with this duty does not relieve an attacker of complying with its own obligations
under the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in
attack,160 although the applicability of this rule during operations has sometimes
been questioned.161
V. COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND INCIDENTAL INJURY
Even if an attack targets a lawful military objective and the attacker has taken
every feasible precaution to minimize the harm to civilians and civilian objects,
the attack must comply with the rule of proportionality. Regarded as a tenet of
customary international law and codified in Articles 51 and 57 of AP I, the
rule prohibits “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
155. AP I, supra note 8, art. 57(2)(c); CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 20; UK MANUAL, supra note 11,
¶ 5.32.8; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 8.9.2; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 37;
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 58; JP 3-60, supra note 61, Appendix A, ¶ 6(b)(2)(b).
156. John F. Burns, U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2006.
157. See Pamela Hess, Propaganda Leaflets Dropped over Iraq, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Mar. 18, 2003),
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2003/03/18/Propaganda-leaflets-dropped-over-
Iraq/UPI-81231048022702/.
158. See Olga Khazan, Israeli Army Drops Warning Leaflets on Gaza, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/15/israeli-army-drops-warning-leaflets-
on-gaza/ (describing Israeli Defense Force use of its official Twitter account in conjunction with actual
leaflet drops to warn civilians to avoid being co-located with Hamas operatives and facilities).
159. AP I, supra note 8, art. 58; see also AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 42-44.
160. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(7).
161. See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 163-68 (1990).
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advantage anticipated.”162 The harm to civilians is technically labeled “in-
cidental injury,” while that to civilian objects is “collateral damage.” However,
common usage generally fails to distinguish between the two and usually uses
the latter term, as is done here, to refer to both.
Proportionality does not require a strict mathematical comparison, nor does
it, as is often mistakenly believed, call for a balancing test with the scales
resting at equilibrium; rather, likely collateral damage only precludes attack
when it is “excessive” – that is, “when there is a significant imbalance between
the military advantage anticipated, on the one hand, and the expected collateral
damage to civilians and civilian objects, on the other.”163 At its core, the rule is
an acknowledgement that collateral damage may be unavoidable in order to
successfully execute an attack.
Although the issue is not entirely settled,164 the better view is that collateral
damage includes both direct and indirect effects.165 Direct effects are “the
immediate, first order consequences, unaltered by intervening events or mecha-
nisms,” whereas indirect effects are “the delayed and/or displaced second-,
third-, and higher-order consequences of action, created through intermediate
events or mechanisms.”166 Therefore, any collateral damage that is foreseeable
to an attacker at the time of planning, approving, or executing an attack must be
considered during the proportionality calculation.
As indicated by the terms “expected” and “anticipated,” compliance with the
rule of proportionality is assessed based upon the information reasonably
available to the attacker at the time the attack was planned, approved, or
executed. It is not determined by the collateral damage or military advantage
that actually resulted; the assessment is ex ante rather than post factum. Several
recent reports regarding the use of unmanned aerial systems, or so-called
drones, have been critical of such attacks because, inter alia, they have resulted
in civilian deaths.167 However, the existence of civilian casualties, no matter
how numerous, does not alone violate the rule of proportionality. A strike must
instead be evaluated against expected civilian casualties in light of the military
advantages the attacker anticipated attaining through the operation.
It should be cautioned that those with the ability to control an engagement
have a continuing duty to comply with this rule.168 Thus, for example, if a
soldier who is ordered to attack a building in which enemy forces have
162. AP I, supra note 8, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(ii), 57(2)(b); see also CIHL Study, supra note 12,
r. 14; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 2.6; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 5.3.3; AMW
MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 14; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 51; Galic´ Judgment, supra note 26,
58.
163. AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 14, ¶ 7; MELZER, supra note 54, at 360.
164. AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 14, ¶ 4.
165. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 51, ¶ 6.
166. JP 3-60, supra note 61, Chapter II, ¶ 5e(1)-(2).
167. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 4, at 58; HRW Drone Report, supra note 4, at 87-88;
Emmerson 2013, supra note 4; Emmerson 2014, supra note 4; Heyns 2013, supra note 4, ¶ 75.
168. AP I, supra note 8, art. 57 (2)(b); CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 19.
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barricaded themselves becomes aware that, contrary to the intelligence available
at the time the order was issued, civilians are unexpectedly present, the soldier
must reassess the proportionality of the attack and either alter his means or
methods of attack to avoid excessive collateral damage, or cease the attack
altogether.
Consider, for instance, the targeting of Taliban leaders in Afghanistan. In
many instances, attacks are launched at night while the targeted individual is in
a residence, presumably sleeping; family members may also be present. For
operational reasons, it is often not feasible to attack at other times or places.
When considering whether to proceed, those deciding on the operation must
first identify the anticipated military advantage of eliminating the individual
based upon his prior actions and function in the organization. They then
estimate the expected loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property. In
some instances, the leader may not be of sufficient stature to merit any signifi-
cant loss of civilian life and the operation will be prohibited as a matter of law.
In others, the balance may weigh in favor of targeting the leader, even though
civilian deaths will result.169
IHL also imposes a number of restrictions on specific tactics. The two most
significant are based on the broad prohibition on indiscriminate attacks.170 First,
it is unlawful to engage in attacks “which are not directed at a specific military
objective” (as distinct from those which are aimed at an unlawful target).171 In
other words, the attacker employs force without heed to whether lawful or
unlawful targets will be struck, as in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah’s
launching of rockets into Israel,172 or the recent use of “barrel bombs” in
Syria.173 Second, “[a]ttacks which treat as a single military objective a number
of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town,
village, or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian
169. See Heyns, supra note 5, ¶ 71 (acknowledging that compliance with the rule of proportionality
“needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, depending on the specific context and considering the
totality of the circumstances,” including “the value of the target, which determines the level of
permissible collateral damage . . . .”).
170. See Galic´ Judgment, supra note 26, ¶ 57.
171. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(4)(a); CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 11-12; UK MANUAL, supra
note 11, ¶ 5.23.1; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 5.3.2; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12,
r. 13(b); TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 49. See also Prosecutor v. Kordic´ and C˘ erkez, Decision on
Joint Defence Motion, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, ¶ 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia
Mar. 22, 1999); Prosecutor v. Martic´, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 462-63 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Martic´, IT-95-11-A, ICTY Appeals Judgment,
¶¶ 239-40, 247, 250-52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, Oct. 8, 2008).
172. See JEREMY M. SHARP, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33566, LEBANON: THE ISRAEL-HAMAS-
HEZBOLLAH CONFLICT, CRS-8 (Aug. 14, 2006).
173. Aryn Baker, Syria’s Deadly ‘Barrel Bombs’: Assad Regime Uses Devastating, Makeshift
Weapon, TIME (Jan. 13, 2014), http://world.time.com/2014/01/13/syrias-deadly-barrel-bombs-assad-
regime-uses-devastating-makeshift-weapon/.
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objects are prohibited.”174 An example would be regarding an entire village as a
target when it is possible to strike the specific buildings in which insurgents are
located.
VI. LOCATION OF THE TARGET
With respect to the geography of targeting operations, it is important to
emphasize the distinction between the body of law that governs the use of
force by one state into the territory of another (jus ad bellum and the law of
neutrality) and the law that controls how targeting must be conducted (jus in
bello).175 The legality of penetrating another state’s borders has no bearing on
the legality of the actions taken during targeting, and vice versa.
During IACs, targeting may be conducted against valid military objectives
within the territory of any of the belligerent states, including their territorial
sea and the airspace above it, as well as in international waters and airspace.176
Belligerent military activities may not take place in the territory, territorial
waters, or territorial airspace of a neutral country.177 However, in order to enjoy
the protection afforded neutral states by the IHL law of armed conflict, a neutral
state must equally prohibit the use of its territory by any of the belligerents.
If a belligerent attempts to use the territory of a neutral state in support of
military activities, the neutral state has an obligation to take measures, including
the use of force, to prevent or end that use.178 For instance, when Iranian F-4
fighters attempted to use the airspace above Saudi Arabian territorial waters to
attack two ships during the Iran-Iraq War in 1984, Saudi Arabia, which claimed
neutrality during the conflict, attacked them in order to defend its territorial
sovereignty and comply with its neutral obligations.179 Should a neutral state be
either unable or unwilling to comply with that obligation, the opposing belliger-
ent parties may conduct operations, including attacks, necessary to put an end to
174. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(5)(a); CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 13; UK MANUAL, supra note 11,
¶ 5.23.2; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 5.3.2; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 13(c);
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 50.
175. For a more detailed discussion of the importance of distinguishing between the two bodies of
law, see Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in
Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47 (2009).
176. International waters begin at the outer limits of a coastal state’s territorial sea. U.S. COMMAND-
ER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 1.9. International airspace is the airspace located above international
waters, including the contiguous and exclusive economic zones. United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea art. 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 12.14; AMW
MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 1(b), ¶ 8.
177. Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague Convention V]; Convention No. XIII
Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415.
178. Hague Convention V, supra note 177, art. 5; Rules concerning the Control of Wireless
Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, Drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague arts. 42,
47, Dec. 1922-Feb. 1923 (Hague Rules on Air Warfare); UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 1.43; U.S.
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 7.3; AMW MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 168(a), 170(c).
179. Richard Halloran, 2 Iranian Fighters Reported Downed by Saudi Air Force, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
1984.
2014] 407PRECISION AND BALANCE IN TARGETING
their opponent’s misuse of neutral territory (a principle that should not be
confused with the ongoing debate over the jus ad bellum concept of unwilling/
unable in the self-defense context).180
The geographical limits of non-international armed conflict are less clear. The
fact that a non-international armed conflict is underway does not permit a state
to cross into other states to conduct operations. Instead, the state where the
operation is underway must consent to the operations, they must be authorized
by the UN Security Council, or the actions must be taken consistent with the
jus ad bellum right of self-defense.181 Typically, this latter option requires that
the territorial state be unwilling or unable to put an end to the misuse of its
territory by the non-state group.182 The paradigmatic examples are the drone
strikes into Pakistan that have not been authorized by that country’s govern-
ment.
The fact that an operation may be mounted in another country during an
NIAC does not answer the question of how it may be conducted. Its answer
depends on whether IHL or other bodies of law govern the operation. Attacks
conducted on the state’s territory with a nexus to the conflict are clearly subject
to IHL. However, there is an on-going debate about whether IHL applies
outside the state involved in an NIAC.183 One view is that it does not, although
that interpretation appears to be losing adherents rapidly. A second position,
advocated by the ICRC, is that IHL applies in cross-border areas into which an
NIAC’s hostilities have spilled over and thus would govern any targeting
there.184 A third view maintains that the reach of IHL is dependent on party
180. UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 1.43; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, ¶ 7.3; AMW
MANUAL, supra note 12, r. 168(b); TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, cmt. accompanying r. 94, ¶ 4. The
concept of “unwilling/unable” in the neutrality context, “one of long-standing,” should not be confused
with its jus ad bellum counterpart in the law of self-defense. For an excellent academic treatment of the
jus ad bellum concept, see Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework
for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012). For earlier treatment of the issue see
Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 540-43
(2003).
181. See generally Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting, supra note 58.
182. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013) (“[W]e act . . . when there are no other governments capable of effectively
addressing the threat.”); OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, FACT SHEET: U.S. POLICY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF
ACTIVE HOSTILITIES (2013) (requiring “[a]n assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the
country where the action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S.
persons”). See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER: LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE,
DRAFT, 1-2 (2011); John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterror-
ism, Address at the Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security
by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011).
183. Emmerson 2014, supra note 4, ¶ 71(d) (identifying the lack of international consensus around
this and other questions of law in the counterterrorism context).
184. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY
ARMED CONFLICT 9-12 (2011), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-
movement/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf/.
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status, not on geography.185 The distinction is critical, for if IHL does not
govern the conduct of targeting, norms contained in domestic law and human
rights law will regulate the operation. The latter generally limits attacks to
situations in which lethal force is necessary to prevent death or grievous bodily
injury; it does not allow status-based targeting.186
CONCLUSION
International lawyers, policymakers, operators, and others engaged in the
contemporary debates over targeting issues would be well served by knowing
the specific prescriptive norms resident in targeting law. Such principles and
rules should, and must, shape their positions by signaling the boundaries they
cannot cross. Unfortunately, some of the dialogue has been ill-informed and
sloppily conducted. The cost can be measured in terms of human suffering.
The debate must equally display sensitivity to IHL’s underlying logic. As
noted at the outset, the law of targeting is designed to balance the military
necessity of being able to conduct operations effectively while minimizing harm
to civilians, civilian property, other protected persons and objects, and, to some
extent, even combatants. Lack of sensitivity to this balancing act will engender
interpretations of the law that play out on the battlefield in ways that do not
reflect the equilibrium. When that happens, IHL’s prescriptive effect is inevita-
bly weakened, as states will no longer see it in their interest to comply with its
constituent norms. Therefore, not only must IHL principles and rules be grasped
with precision, but they must be applied with strict fidelity to their object,
purpose, and underlying foundational balance.
185. See Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflict,
90 INT’L L. STUDIES 1 (2014).
186. See Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana,
Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, at 110-16 (1991) (reporting on the
basic principles on the use of force by law enforcement officials).
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